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BULGARIA'S RESPONSE TO REFUGEE MIGRATION: INSTITUTIONALIZING THE BOUNDARY OF EXCLUSION  
The consistent securitization of migration in Europe of the past decades has been consequential: one of 
its most visible aspects is currently displayed in the regulation of asylum in Europe. By constructing 
migrants as physical and ontological threat, by re-drawing borders as barriers against otherness, by re-
affirming the identity-maintenance aspects of citizenship, the securitization of migration and the 
lumping of asylum together with migration in all key EU regulatory moves has enabled the 
rationalisation of protection from asylum-seekers. This article takes up a national study of the policy 
narratives and practices around one of the understudied recent asylum hotspots in the EU: the 
Bulgarian-Turkish border forming part of the external EU border. The analysis emphasizes how the re-
bordering dynamics identified in Bulgaria (as a EU member-state) is embedded within similar narratives 
and practices at all levels of EU asylum politics. It argues that these (re-)bordering narratives and 
practices undermine the notion of protection, weaken the Europeanization of asylum, and threaten the 
legitimacy of political communities in the EU. These consequences need to be taken into account when 
studying the struggle between human rights and democracy in the regulation of asylum, as well as when 
discussing the strategic direction of EU migration governance.  
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The European Union (EU) attracts thousands of asylum-seekers a year and this is not likely to 
change, given crises and instability in the Middle East and Africa. Despite the deadly risks, the 
numbers of people trying to cross a EU border of sovereignty has only been increasing. This 
faces the EU with at least two important tasks. First, it must strike the right balance between 
securitizing (irregular) migration and regulating asylum in the language of human rights 
(compare with Benhabib, 2005). The alternative is perpetuating the paradoxes the EU asylum 
framework is seen to produce (e.g. Toscano, 2013; Toshkov and de Haan, 2013; Ripoll Servent 
and Trauner, 2014; Tolay, 2014) and eroding the normative power of human rights in Europe, 
especially when it comes to asylum-seekers (and migrants in general). Second, the EU must find 
a way of receiving hundreds of thousands of asylum-seekers annually without detriment to the 
legitimacy of (already challenged) political communities in the member states (see Delanty, 
Wodak and Jones, 2011 for a detailed overview of this problématique). Otherwise it risks 
mounting social tension and intergroup hostility. This is particularly relevant to EU's more 
recent attempts to find a middle ground in the field of migration governance (Scholten et al., 
2015). 
This article explores Bulgaria's response to refugee migration in view of these two big tasks. 
Bulgaria embraced its responsibilities for guarding the outer EU border with the ambition of a 
Nevena Nancheva 
Page 2 of 19 
 
new member and the reliance on the EU that could be expected from one of the poorest 
member states. In this sense, Bulgaria promises a good example of the national implementation 
of the experimented Common European Asylum System (CEAS) (Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; 
Gibney, 2004; Kaunert, 2009; Ippolito and Velluti; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012b, see also Block 
and Bonjour, 2013 for the contradictory dynamics of the process of Europeanization). The 
analysis of Bulgaria's response to the refugee influx of 2013-14, offered below, demonstrates 
two things. First, security thinking and acts of securitization (Huysmans, 2006: 149) have 
completely overhauled the human rights aspects of asylum, institutionalizing a peculiar EU 
predicament: policies that aim at protection from asylum-seekers, rather than at protection of 
asylum-seekers. Second, these policies reinforce a very visible exclusion of asylum-seekers from 
participation in the political community of the state, spelling a recipe for xenophobia, racism, 
and segregation, with all their concomitant evils that the EU has been proclaiming to combat. 
What this article aims to show is that by framing asylum-seekers into security thinking and by 
consolidating their exclusion, Bulgaria's policy practices and narratives (as per Boswell, Geddes 
and Scholten, 2011) delineate a political community with rigid borders. This community re-
attaches to nationhood in a way that is incompatible with the normative space of 
Europeanization (Nancheva, 2015). Yet, it reflects and sustains (re-)bordering policy practices 
and narratives about asylum from all levels of EU asylum governance. In this sense the failures 
of refugee protection in the studied case should not be seen as national 'policy malintegration' 
(Boswell and Geddes, 2011), as weak Europeanization of asylum in Bulgaria. Rather, they should 
be understood, within the context of European integration, as EU asylum governance that 
works against the normative foundation of Europeanization. Unsurprisingly, the increasing 
migration pressures towards the EU have concurred with the unravelling of EU solidarity 
(Langford, 2013) and has challenged one of the central features of the European Community - 
open borders.  
The rest of the article is organized in two sections. Section one frames the above claims 
theoretically and examines the relevance of the problem of political community in the context 
of asylum regulation. Section two introduces the case study of an understudied regional 
context and analyses the mechanisms of institutionalizing exclusion of asylum-seekers during 
the process of claiming asylum in Bulgaria. It follows the similarities of Bulgaria's response with 
asylum governance in the EU. The investigation argues that the dynamics of re-bordering which 
has characterized both comes at the cost of limiting access to asylum, undermining the 
standard of protection, and nurturing the seeds of nationalism, xenophobia and 'xeno-racism' 
(Delanty et al, 2011: 3). It thus threatens both the precarious balance struck when Europeanizing 
asylum (the CEAS), and the precarious political solidarity within member states and among 
them (as has become obvious in the unfolded disagreements over relocation quotas and 
burden sharing in 2015-2016).  
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Section I 
Ever since it pledged to establish a common asylum framework (which it formally did in 2013), 
the EU has consistently been improving the supranational legal basis of asylum governance 
(Kaunert and Léonard, 2012a). Nevertheless, it crumbled under unprecedented pressure in the 
summer of 2015 (and throughout the preceding year), inviting scrutiny upon its own rules and 
culprits for failing them. Many analysts pointed to individual 'rogue' states for breaking the 
rules either to the advantage of refugees (prominently Germany, but also Italy, Sweden) or to 
their disadvantage (Hungary, Austria most recently, but previously Greece, Bulgaria). In many 
ways the key to understanding how and why the EU asylum framework is failing is hidden 
within the modalities of national implementation. This article argues, however, that the 
national context cannot be detached from the supranational framework, because it follows 
identical narratives and practices: those of securitization and exclusion implied in the dynamics 
of bordering and re-bordering (see also Anderson, 2013; Mezzadra and Neilson, 2013). By 
tracing the dynamics of (re-)bordering in a specific national context, the analysis aims to show 
its implications for the rigidity of national political communities but also for the fragility of EU 
solidarity on asylum governance and well beyond. In this sense, the contribution this article 
attempts to make addresses issues of political community and the basis of solidarity in a EU 
member state. It is also linked to the problematique of EU solidarity and the notion of 
supranational community in Europe. 
National decision-making prerogatives in the field of asylum have been structured and to some 
extent limited by EU's attempts to harmonize asylum, thus recasting and liberalizing the EU 
system (Kaunert, 2009; Bonjour and Vink, 2013; Block and Bonjour, 2013), even though analysts 
observe that the EU is still far from supranational governance (Kaunert and Léonard, 2012a). 
The requirements of EU law, particularly the Dublin system's first member state rule which 
assigns taking charge responsibility to the EU member asylum-seekers reach first, have 
mobilized sufficient national opposition to become unpopular (Thielemann and Armstrong, 
2013). The Dublin rules have been especially criticized for placing disproportionate burden on 
member states along the external border, such as Bulgaria, with their requirement to transfer 
back asylum-seekers already dispersed in the EU (see also Thielemann and Armstrong, 2013). In 
order to prevent more asylum-seekers from entering its territory, Bulgaria (like Greece earlier 
and Hungary more recently) has been fortifying its physical borders. At the same time, it has 
been struggling to provide a standard of protection in compliance with the recast and 
improving EU rules. Such contradictory policy moves have often been described in the literature 
as weak Europeanization, policy failure, and 'malintegration' of asylum (Hollifield, 2004; Boswell 
and Geddes, 2011; Thielemann, 2012; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012b, Boswell, 2014), thus 
presuming a discrepancy between EU level and national level policies and narratives. This 
article treats the EU and the national level as inextricably intertwined. It demonstrates, 
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however, that there is indeed a discrepancy. This arises from the policy narratives and practices 
of (re-)bordering employed at all levels of EU asylum governance and their incompatibility with 
the normative basis of European integration that is predicated upon the transformation of 
national borders into linking and not separating spaces (Balibar, 1998).  
The justification of the move from a sophisticated human rights legal framework to a restrictive 
political interpretation of asylum has been made possible by narratives and practices of security 
(also, Geddes, 2000: 68). This article focuses on a key element in the making and talking of 
security - borders and bordering - and demonstrates its centrality in Bulgaria's response to the 
temporary but overwhelming stream of asylum-seekers through the segment of the southern 
EU border it guards. As the case study will emphasize, the EU sustains and indeed actively 
assists the territorial re-bordering dynamics. The policy narratives of high security and threat 
which territorial re-bordering yields, in turn, give rise to exclusionary moves at organizational 
and institutional level (see also Fassin, 2011). Narrow national interpretation of EU rules and 
legislation seem to permit this, even though nominally the EU standard has moved towards 
liberalization. Subsequently, the re-bordering dynamics becomes reflected into conceptual 
frameworks, which trickle down to public perceptions and reactions towards asylum-seekers 
(Green, 2010). It reinforces rigid political communities nationally and is bound to generate 
societal tensions in view of increasing refugee migration flows. Thus it works against national 
interests which restrictive national policies against asylum claim to uphold. The securitization of 
asylum in Europe also works against the normative logic and policy goals of EU migration 
governance which emphasises the need to 'mainstream' migrant integration (Scholten, 2015). 
Furthermore, it undermines the normative promise of European integration by reinforcing 
nationalist, exclusionary visions of political community that the European project was launched 
to transgress (e.g. Karolewski and Kaina, 2011). Finally, the securitization of asylum and the re-
bordering of asylum-seekers within European political communities subverts the notion of 
international protection itself, by placing in danger the physical survival and the psychological 
wellbeing of persons who are entitled to protection and rights under international and national 
law, as well as under the EU acquis.  
At the national level, the most widely applied and most effective technique for coping with 
increased refugee migration has been restricting access to the territory together with 
restricting the interpretation of the qualification conditions. But this policy move finds its firm 
background into the inability of the CEAS to respond to an intensified flow of asylum-seekers 
without the impression of fortifying the external borders even further (e.g. Léonard, 2010). It 
also reflects EU-wide processes of securitizing migration and lumping asylum together with 
irregular migration; a crisis of confidence in the fairness of governance; dubious moves to re-
work the asylum framework to address the renewed refugee flows driven by the attraction of 
the EU as a beacon of peace and stability. In this sense, the restrictive national application of 
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the asylum rules in EU member states and the exclusionary practices and narratives 
institutionalized at every step of the asylum-seeking process could be better understood as 
upholding a particular vision of the Europeanization of asylum - dressed in the language and 
policy tools of security and statehood, rather than as a deviation from or a failure of 
Europeanization. Analysing the problem of exclusionary national practices and narratives on 
asylum within the broader context of Europeanization and the general securitization of 
migration is important because it offers both an avenue for fully understanding the problem, 
and for beginning to address it politically.  
The paper applies Andrew Geddes' conceptualization of borders as territorial, organizational or 
conceptual 'zones of interaction' between asylum-seekers and their host societies/ states 
(2008). The analysis demonstrates that the multi-dimensional borders that asylum-seekers hit 
upon their contact with a national asylum system in the EU have been upheld at all levels of 
asylum governance (supranational, regional, national, local), and have been internalized into 
domestic public perceptions. The case study is explicitly focused on territorial, organizational 
and conceptual (re-)bordering policy practices and policy narratives, and their implications for 
the provision of protection, for the harmonization of asylum, and for the political communities 
which host asylum-seekers. The paper emphasizes the general compatibility of Bulgaria's 
response to intensified refugee migration with EU policy practices and policy narratives on 
asylum. It thus calls for re-examining the claim for policy failure of the CEAS, but it also suggests 
that the 'success' of the regime leaves little to be celebrated.   
To begin with, the institutionalization of exclusion of asylum-seekers has been compounded by 
the securitization of migration in the EU (Huysmans, 2006) and the consistent lumping of 
asylum together with it in all key policy documents and narratives. This dynamics can be easily 
traced at the level of EU policies and politics. Singling out irregular migrants as a central internal 
security threat, the policy narratives easily position asylum-seekers as intruders into a world 
preserved for others. The rhetoric of 'influx', 'crisis', 'overwhelming', 'emergency' help perform 
this narrative move. Its policy translation at the EU level has been to frame asylum as a high 
priority security issue (e.g. the extraordinary European Council summit on 23 April 2015 and its 
action plan, the summit on 25 June 2015), thus giving rise, as the case study in section two will 
demonstrate, to morally questionable and sometimes outright illegal measures to curb 
migratory flows of asylum-seekers by physically fortifying the national borders (e.g. Fargue and 
Fandrich, 2012: 11f). This is captured by the territorial re-bordering of asylum-seekers.  
The organizational borders erected before asylum-seekers have been reinforced by the push 
and pull between the supranational and the national in the regulation of asylum in the EU. On 
the one hand, an attempt towards harmonizing asylum has raised many expectations before 
the EU framework, particularly in view of access to procedure, reception conditions, and 
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qualification criteria, which have all been recast in direct reference to asylum as a fundamental 
right. On the other hand, member states have retained key competences with regard to border 
security and control, as well as in-procedure and post-status integration provisions. The 
resulting discrepancies in the asylum regulations across the EU are a key factor in perpetuating 
the imbalances of the CEAS (El-Enany and Thielemann, 2011; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012) and 
its inconsistent implementation.  
Finally, but not less crucially, the institutionalization of exclusion of asylum-seekers has been 
compounded by the erection of a myriad of conceptual borders at both the EU and the national 
level. The crisis of confidence which the EU has been battling over the past decade has been 
paralleled by an all-European crisis of governance deteriorated by an economic crisis. As 
austerity has eroded the 'permissive consensus' (Hooghe and Marks, 2009) that had ensured 
the progress of integration, the struggle for access to resources of the welfare state have re-
focused European politics back to the national political communities (also Anderson, 2013) and 
to the logic of nationalism determining their legitimacy (Nancheva, 2015). Within that, all non-
members of the community – be it from other EU member states or from third countries – are 
constructed in terms of otherness. Asylum-seekers, as highly dependent on the welfare 
provision, have come to be seen as a particular economic 'burden'. This narrative move, 
complemented by cultural, religious and ethno-national differences, has worked toward 
constructing asylum-seekers as a multi-faceted physical and ontological threat (Rumelili, 2015), 
and has been reflected in public attitudes, varying from non-acceptance and prejudice to 
segregation and physical violence.  
The territorial, organizational and conceptual borders erected before asylum-seekers at both 
the national level and the EU have reinforced the institutionalisation of exclusion. Their 
outcome in policy practices and in policy narratives has ultimately been taking the element of 
protection away from the protection provision, and legitimizing the notion of asylum-seekers as 
a security threat. Within this complex dynamics spanning the various levels of European 
politics, the highly restrictive national application of European asylum legislation and the 
exclusionary practices at the national level begin to seem less like a policy failure of 
Europeanization and more like a logical outcome of it. The case study of Bulgaria's response to 
increased refugee migration through its border with Turkey of the years 2013-1015 illustrates 
this point. Complementing policy analysis (border security, control and management) with 
discourse analysis of the policy narratives which underlie the adopted policies, the following 
paragraphs examine the implications of the complex dynamics of re-bordering for the quality of 
international protection, for the normative credibility of the Europeanization of asylum, and for 
the legitimacy of political community in Bulgaria as a EU member state.  
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Section II 
Against the background of migrant boat tragedies in the Mediterranean, comparatively little 
analytical attention was paid to the flow of migrants through the dry land points of entry along 
the southern EU border until well into the summer of 2015. This is especially true for the 240 
km long segment of the border between Bulgaria and Turkey, from Kapitan Andreevo to Rezovo 
on the EU side, which for a brief period between the summer of 2013 and the spring of 2014 
became the preferred land route into the EU of asylum seekers from Syria and beyond. It was in 
October-November 2013 that media coverage on Bulgaria started to notice the influx of 
asylum-seekers through the new route, which Bulgaria was obviously unable to receive. The 
numbers of registered asylum applications rose steeply from 890 in 2011 to 11081 in 2014 and 
20391 in 2015 (Bulgarian State Agency for Refugees statistics). The low reception capacity and 
the sharply increased numbers soon unfolded into a full-blown refugee crisis (UNHCR 
observations 2 January 2014, Council of Europe Human Rights Commissioner comments 20 
December 2013, Bulgarian Helsinki Committee open letter to the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior 
of 28 October 2013, Amnesty International News 2 January 2014, ECRE Bulletin 11 April 2014, 
etc). The situation was somewhat halted by mid-2014 with the joint effort of EU institutions 
and member states, the UNHCR, international and local non-governmental organizations and 
grassroots activists. But the manner in which this was accomplished raises concerns about 
Bulgaria's refugee protection commitments, and about the political priorities of the CEAS.  
Territorial Borders 
When news came out of the 'substandard conditions' within which Bulgaria received Syrian 
asylum-seekers in late 2013, the official reaction of the European community was shock and 
indignation (see Amnesty Briefing EUR 15/002/2013). As the country's reception capacity had 
by far been insufficient to accommodate the newcomers, they were being accommodated in 
long-abandoned military barracks and schools which lacked basic sanitary facilities. Bulgaria 
struggled to provide medical aid and even subsistence. This led the UNHCR to call in January 
2014 for suspension of Dublin transfers of asylum-seekers to the country until further 
examination. The suspension of obligations under the EU acquis was meant to allow Bulgaria 
time to address the deficiencies in its asylum provision. Apart from reception conditions, 
concerns were raised that 'a large numbers of new-coming asylum-seekers were not registered 
and were not provided with the necessary documents, as required by international and EU law' 
(UNHCR 2 Jan 2014). With urgent financial assistance from the European Commission, 
individual member states and the UNHCR, reception conditions in the existing centres were 
brought up to basic standards, and the backlog in processing asylum claims had been cleared in 
the first two months of 2014. It was, however, noted that nationalities other than Syrians were 
deterred from applying for asylum and, once application was lodged, it took much longer to 
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process (Amnesty Briefing EUR 15/002/2014, 4). Furthermore, testimonies began to surface of 
forced returns/ push backs of prospective asylum-seekers from the territory of Bulgaria 
(reported meticulously by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty's SOS Europe). It is in light of this 
evidence that Bulgaria's response to the refugee crisis of 2013-14 needs to be re-examined.  
Indeed, the Bulgarian interior ministry's key effort was aimed at controlling the Bulgarian-
Turkish border. In cooperation with their Turkish counterparts, Bulgarian border police started 
sharing camera surveillance data with the aim of alerting Turkish authorities about approaching 
subjects and deterring them from reaching the Bulgarian side of the border. Despite 
constituting possible prevention of access to asylum procedure to people who in all probability 
would have been entitled to it, this border control and management technique enjoyed wide 
legitimacy domestically: the then minister of defence Angel Naydenov openly spoke of 
Bulgaria's right 'to return refugees (sic!) to Turkish territory', even though he also called in the 
same instance for sympathy with 'the drama of these people' (Sega newspaper, 22 Sep 2013). 
The Bulgarian then interior minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov openly lists returning illegally entered 
Syrians to Turkey as an example of good practice shaped with the cooperation of Frontex, 
which has facilitated Bulgarian border control since 2012 (TV Evropa News, 23 Jun 2012). At the 
time of the Syrian refugee crisis of 2013-14 the European border agency Frontex was present 
along the Bulgarian-Turkish border through the Poseidon Land 2013 operation providing 
terrestrial and airborne surveillance and enhanced debriefing activities. Its Focal Points Land 
2014 operation extended Frontex presence at designated border crossing points in Bulgaria 
(among other countries, see archive of Frontex operations). As early as 5 Mar 2014 the head of 
Frontex Ilka Laitinen declared at a press briefing that the 'situation at the Bulgarian-Turkish 
border is under control' (BTA, 5 Mar 2014). This assessment came four months into the 
Bulgarian government's Containment Plan for managing the migrant crisis (Council of Ministers, 
Sofia 7 Nov 2013). The plan included, among other things, the building of a razor-edge fencing 
facility and the deployment of 1400 (plus 100) strong police unit in order to ensure the '100% 
control' of sensitive areas along the border (according to the document). As a result of these 
measures, the numbers of irregular crossings sharply dropped from thousands in the autumn of 
2013 to 139 in Jan 2014 and 124 in Feb 2014 (Ministry of Interior report 10 Mar 2014). 
It is obvious from these numbers that access to the territory of Bulgaria has been hindered. 
Given the humanitarian situation in Syria and the thousands of Syrians already known to have 
crossed into Turkey, refugee organizations declare that this in itself contains an indirect breach 
of the right to asylum under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the access to asylum 
procedure under the EU Asylum Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC, Art. 6) to those willing to 
claim it. The fact that this happens with the cooperation and public support of Frontex indicates 
that fortifying the external border is a legitimate EU strategy for coping with high numbers of 
people displaced by the conflict in Syria and looking to re-build their lives in Europe. At the 
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same time, however, increasing border control and cooperating with the Turkish authorities to 
prevent access to the Bulgarian side of the border is not the only way in which access to asylum 
procedure has been denied to potential asylum-seekers. Numerous reports and investigations 
by refugee organizations and local activists indicate unecquivocably that pushing migrants who 
have already crossed the border back into the territory of Turkey, often violently and causing 
serious physical harm, has become standard practice (Human Rights Watch, 
bulgaria.bordermonitoring.eu, etc.). This is despite Bulgaria's official assurances that the 
policemen are supposed to deter people 'by their mere presence' and cannot return people 
who have already crossed (Head of the Union of Officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Valentin Popov, Struma news 12 Dec 2013). During the deployment of the additional police 
force, the official version of the Bulgarian government has been that the goal is 'to funnel 
asylum-seekers to the designated border checkpoints, for their own safety' (e.g. Prime Minister 
Borisov in parliament, verbatim reports 29 Jan 2014). The persistence with which this claim has 
been made in the official public space stands in stark contrast with the fact that such an 
outcome is physically impossible, as Turkish officials cannot let irregular migrants cross the 
checkpoints on their side to get to Bulgaria's checkpoints. Legitimizing the territorial re-
bordering thus works against the practical possibility of providing protection but remains 
entirely unsanctioned.  
Around this time independent sources began to indicate that Bulgarian police indiscriminately 
beat migrants, take their mobile phones or clothing, and return them on Turkish territory, often 
upon lethal risks of exposure (e.g. Asylum Information Database Country Report Bulgaria, 
January 2015; Cihan news, Edirne 12 Mar 2015). A hidden camera material was broadcast by 
the Bulgarian National Television in December 2013 showing (anonymous) testimonies of 
individual border policemen speaking of instructions by their commanding officers to beat 
('selectively', avoiding women and children) and push back approaching migrants (BNT 16 Dec 
2013). The scandalous material also referred to a specific case of an apprehended group ('of 
approximately forty people') which was 'sent back'. Against the continuous background of such 
testimonies, officially denied by the Chief Commissioner of Border Police and by the interior 
minister, the deaths of two Iraqi men who attempted to cross the border into Bulgaria in March 
2015 came as evidence of the practice (also UNHCR news 31 Mar 2015). The men, who died of 
hypothermia, were badly beaten before being stripped of their belongings and abandoned on 
the Turkish side of the border, as surviving witnesses from the same group testified. In view of 
such compelling evidence, the infringement procedure launched by the European Commission 
for suspected refoulement of Syrian asylum-seekers in Apr 2014 has not acquired the expected 
publicity, neither does it hold sufficient clout with its envisaged fines if infringement is 
established. The Bulgarian government has in the meantime extended the razor edge fence. 
Furthermore, and despite initial resistance on behalf of the minister of defense Nikolay 
Nenchev, 180 troops have been deployed in early 2015 to 'support logistically' border police in 
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controlling the border (Ministry of Defence briefing, 24 Jan 2015). This tentative move to re-
militarize the border is a clear indication of the dynamics of institutionalizing exclusion of 
asylum-seekers from the territory of an EU member state, employed without breaking 
operative cooperation with EU border authorities. In this sense, the practice speaks louder than 
the actual narrative used when employing it (similarly, Bigo, 2014). 
Organizational Borders 
The physical re-bordering of asylum-seekers away from the territory of the EU has gone hand in 
hand with organizational re-bordering on EU territory. It is sometimes argued that complicating 
the asylum provision should serve as a deterrent for prospective migrants (Lindstrøm, 2005: 589; 
also Mayblin, 2014). Such policy narrative is clearly misplaced, if the increased numbers of 
(failed) attempts at crossing a EU border are anything to go by (see also Thielemann, 2012). But 
the numerous rules that legally prevent asylum-seekers from leading an active life during their 
procedures have another important implication for the future of member states' political 
communities. Institutional, financial and legislative hurdles preventing asylum-seekers from 
access to the labour market, to education, to learning the local language, to health care and 
social care, to housing are bound to produce alienation. Other than preventing asylum-seekers 
from taking control of their lives, such restrictions also perpetuate the gap between them and 
members of the host community of citizens (Mayblin, 2014). By rendering them partially or fully 
dependent on the state while limiting their rights, organizational hurdles upheld in the national 
asylum provision reaffirm the policy narrative of asylum-seekers as second-rate denizens (also 
Anderson, 2013). Legitimizing this narrative as a valid assumption is dangerous for at least two 
big reasons. The first is that a significant percentage of these asylum-seekers are granted some 
sort of protection (whether asylum, temporary, humanitarian or refugee status, as stipulated in 
the Bulgarian legislation Art 1.2 of the 2002 Law on Asylum and Refugees). Once this happens, 
they are expected to 'integrate' into the host society, and their disadvantaged position 
established during the often prolonged time of application is bound to make successful 
integration that much harder. The second reason why the narrative of second-rate denizens is a 
dangerous policy justification is that it directly re-calls the logic of nationalism in outlining the 
boundaries of political community. Legitimizing restrictions for people in need of protection, 
against the backdrop of ever increasing refugee numbers, further emphasizes the normative 
limitations of exclusive national citizenship in the context of postmodernity (cf Fetzer, 2016).  
A good example for this in the studied case is the application of the rules on detention (see also 
Roos and Zaun, 2014). The older EU directive laying down the minimum standards for reception 
conditions (applicable until July 2015) is silent on the issue (Council Directive 2003/9/EC). Both 
the older and the recast directives on asylum procedures plainly prohibit the detention of 
persons on the sole ground that they are applying for asylum (Art. 18 of 2005/85/EC and Art. 26 
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of 2013/32/EU respectively). But the recast directive on reception conditions (which member 
states should have transposed into their national legislations by 20 July 2015 at the latest) goes 
into much greater detail laying down the conditions of detention, 'when it proves necessary' 
(Art. 8.2 of 2013/33/EU; see Art. 8-11). Formally, the purpose of this legislative attention has 
been to stipulate 'a single ground for detention in case of risk of absconding' (see European 
Commission Policies, Asylum). However, the text of the directive leaves abundant scope for 
interpretation which national legislators are asked to agree on (see Art. 8.3. a to f of 
2013/33/EU). It is far from inconceivable to see such interpretation taking the avenue of 
'national security or public order' (Art. 8.3.e of 2013/33/EU) in order to legally justify detention 
of asylum-seekers. The high security narratives which accompany territorial re-bordering 
policies, discussed in the previous paragraphs, certainly facilitate such an interpretative 
direction.  
Indeed, Bulgaria has been applying its national provisions on detention of illegal migrants and 
asylum-seekers both as an attempt to take control of the increased migrant flows, and as a 
response to anti-migrant sentiments among its publics. A very narrow interpretation of the 
Bulgarian penal code, for example, has led to the practice of prosecuting all migrants who have 
entered illegally into the territory of Bulgaria (based on Art. 279.1 of the Penal Code which 
criminalizes illegal entry into the territory). This is despite the fact that the same penal code 
provision (in its paragraph 5) decriminalizes the act if the purpose of entry was claiming asylum. 
Such controversial application of the national legislation (see Savova, 2013) has allowed the 
outright detention of prospective asylum-seekers, and has resulted in the criminal conviction of 
many and renewed detention of those who subsequently break their bail. Other than violating 
a series of international protection commitments, the practice of criminal prosecution and 
detention of asylum-seekers has decisive consequences for their subsequent integration. The 
criminal record which it results in can prevent confirmed status holders from finding suitable 
employment, whereas the psychological aspects of the experience present serious obstacles 
before the meaningful provision of protection and before successful social integration.  
At the same time, the legal and policy narratives on detention also have an impact on the 
application of the asylum procedure, once it begins, and on the conditions of reception. 
According to the current Bulgarian legislation, which is compliant with the EU conditions on 
detention of asylum-seekers, the three existing registration and reception centres in the 
country in Harmanli, Banya and Sofia Ovcha Kupel are formally open access. The fact that 
asylum-seekers can freely leave the centres, however, appears to shock Bulgarian publics (BNT 
16 Dec 2013) and mounting public pressure since the Syrian refugee crisis of 2013-14 has been 
able to challenge some of the open access provisions. The local authorities in Harmanli, for 
example, pushed for officially changing the status of the reception centre to closed one (in a 
letter by the mayor to the prime minister Borisov and to parliament of 21 Jan 2015). A bill 
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discussed in parliament in late 2013 but not passed at the time proposed to amend the law on 
asylum and refugees in this sense (BNR, 18 Dec 2013). The re-instated head of the State Agency 
for Refugees (SAR) Nikola Kazakov, in turn, officially introduced curfews in all reception and 
registration centres as of Feb 2015. Mobilizing local support groups around these causes has 
proved useful in outlining the public safety and security considerations of such measures. But 
restricting asylum-seekers' freedom of movement as a result of their construction as a security 
threat or because they are being threatened is hardly a good foundation for the future integrity 
of the community they are to join. It violates their basic rights as human individuals and it 
undermines EU’s commitments to its own human rights regime. 
Already an indication for the harmful impact of the securitization of asylum-seekers is the very 
low number of children of asylum-seekers attending school. The national law stipulates for 
them equal access to education but in the 2014/15 school year only 29 (of a total of 835) 
asylum-seeking children were registered to attend school by the end of 2014. The low number 
is alarming as only in April 2015 279 children applied for asylum (SAR statistics). In part it is 
linked to incidents of organized protests of parents against enrolling asylum-seeking children in 
local schools. At the same time, the provision for access to education is dependent upon the 
completion of a Bulgarian language course which has not been made available outside the 
capital (despite attempts by SAR to change this regulation) and upon other administrative 
requirements which have not been updated. As a result, the integrative function which access 
to education for children could have played is lost.  
If the EU leadership is looking for a viable governance regime for migrant integration, as its 
policy documents seem to indicate, restrictive national application of the reception conditions 
and asylum procedures standards need to be addressed as a matter of urgency. In this sense 
EASO, whose first task in Bulgaria is to oversee the transposition of the recast asylum acquis 
(see Special Support Plan to Bulgaria EASO/COS/2014/975), could play an important role but 
one that needs to be boosted both by national veto players and by EU decision-makers. In any 
case, the organizational exclusion that asylum-seekers experience as their first contact with the 
institutional structures of the political community that is hosting them do not help prospective 
integration, and are bound to continue to challenge EU rules about settling.  
Conceptual Borders 
The dynamics of re-bordering is also visible at conceptual level, perhaps with most negative 
consequences for the health of the political community and for the provision of protection. The 
conceptual exclusion of asylum-seekers, which the following paragraphs aim to sketch in the 
case of Bulgaria, is an indicator for the actual impact of the bordering practices and narratives 
that have governed the European response to asylum-seekers. The high security markers 
attached to talking about asylum and refugees in the EU public space, as the case study 
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demonstrates, have been internalized and affect the way people perceive asylum-seekers at a 
very personal level. They see them as a physical and ontological threat.  
In Bulgaria, ways of talking about asylum-seekers in terms of security have remained unchecked 
in the public space. The leading media, for example very consistently refer to them as 'illegal 
migrants', despite the obvious legal and factual problems of calling people who have applied for 
asylum in the country 'illegal'. The phrase 'illegal migrants' has become so widely established 
when discussing the problems of asylum and refugees, that even the term 'refugees' is often 
freely subsumed under that category. Despite protests against such wording by professionals 
directly involved with and practicing refugee and migration law, the formula 'asylum-seekers 
equals illegal migrants equals refugees' has not been discredited in the Bulgarian media to this 
day. The implication is the assumption of illegality, which has become attached to asylum-
seekers both in pre- and post-status confirmation period. Through it, the very presence of 
asylum-seekers begins to be perceived as a transgression, and as a threat (see also de Genova, 
2013). This has become obvious on numerous occasions after 2013 in protests organized at a 
grassroot level against asylum-seekers. These protests have become a regular occurrence in 
towns and villages where the new reception and registration centres for asylum-seekers have 
been set up since 2013. They have also accompanied many attempts to relocate asylum-seekers 
to different areas or to include them into public services provision.  
In April 2014, for example, three families of refugees with six small children between them 
were physically chased away from the village of Rozovo after it became clear that they had 
made arrangements to rent a house in the village (BNR 26 Apr 2014). The move was actively 
supported by the mayors of the village and of the nearby town, who called for preserving the 
'ethnic homogeneity of the village' in an official appeal to the ministry of the interior (BTA 30 
Apr 2014). The incident gave way to a lot of soul searching among Bulgarian intellectuals on the 
subject of Bulgarian national identity and its manifestations. It also merited reprimanding on 
behalf of the interior minister and of the ombudsman (BNT 28 Apr 2014). Paradoxically, 
however, the investigation of the incident did not focus on the reprehensible nature of the 
mayor's arguments, nor on the violation of the rights of the refugees, but on whether there had 
been any problems with their status confirmation, or any omissions during their asylum 
procedures. Predictably, such incidents continued to occur over the summer. Towards the 
beginning of the school year in September 2014, similar protests accompanied the prospect of 
twelve asylum-seeking children from the temporary accommodation centre in Kovachevtsi 
starting school together with Bulgarian children in the village of Kalishte (BTV News, 15 Sep 
2014). Local parents, with the help of municipality council members, declared that they were 
against their children 'becoming a minority' in their own school (BNT, 15 Sep 2014). They also 
listed among their concerns fear of diseases and slowing down the progress of their own 
children. The teachers in the school joined the protest, explaining that they could not teach 
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children who did not speak good Bulgarian. This is despite the fact that all asylum-seeking 
children who had been registered to start school had passed a Bulgarian language course over 
the summer, and that minority children starting school in the village as a rule did not speak 
good Bulgarian either. Despite the inadmissibility of the demands, the asylum-seeking parents 
were advised by the police not to send their children to school on the day when the school year 
started 'for their own safety', and they were subsequently moved by the SAR to a school in the 
capital. 
Another example of conceptual re-bordering is the stereotyping of asylum-seekers in utilitarian 
terms. The popular narrative of asylum-seekers treating Bulgaria as but an entry point for a 
route leading up to more prosperous EU member states has been consistently confirmed 
publicly at all institutional levels: the head of the SAR, the interior minister, the prime minister, 
the chief of border police, etc. This narrative has had negative implications for the way asylum-
seekers are being perceived by the Bulgarian publics. First, it frames asylum-seekers as natural 
competition to Bulgarian citizens, who also often seek to find better economic prospects for 
themselves in richer EU members. Such framing undermines the human rights aspect of asylum, 
and positions asylum-seekers as little more than economic migrants. Second, the narrative 
annihilates the normative argument for ensuring a standard of reception, procedure and 
conditions for integration for asylum-seekers in the host community. If asylum-seekers do not 
wish to remain in Bulgaria, and the country is struggling to accommodate them anyway, as it is 
struggling to ensure social provision to its domestic groups of vulnerable citizens, then solving 
the refugee crisis boils down to faster procedures and greater turnout of status decisions. 
Assisted by the EASO, this has, indeed, been one of the ways of coping with the Syrian asylum-
seekers in the period 2013-14. But, as statistics confirm, many asylum-seekers do remain in 
Bulgaria and do need post-status integration support. Emphasizing the transit route narrative at 
an institutional level has revealed the many omissions of Bulgaria's refugee integration 
provision. A third negative consequence is that the transit route narrative helps portray asylum-
seekers as a burden to the state. They 'refuse to work', have skills but 'prefer to be looked 
after', 'syphon off' resources that could have been provided to Bulgarian pensioners or other 
vulnerable people. Such ways of talking have helped introduce the notion of 'sanctions' for 
asylum-seekers and refugees who 'refuse to integrate' (Vice Prime Minister Meglena Kuneva, 
statement 12 Jan 2015). This notion has been upheld at a high authoritative level and has 
slowly been legitimized as a reaction to the pressure applied to Bulgaria to up its refugee 
provision. But introducing the notion of sanctions has further reinforced the idea of asylum-
seekers as transgressors, and has widened the rift between them and the host society. This 
outcome directly threatens societal cohesion, and is hardly in the national interests of Bulgaria, 
especially not in view of continuous refugee migration from the South. EU-level discourses' 
focus on preventing status-holders' secondary movements reflects exactly the same concerns. 
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This article examined the re-bordering dynamics which characterizes Bulgaria's policy practices 
and policy narratives towards asylum, formulated within the framework of EU membership and 
the functioning of the CEAS. The study focused on the context of the recent stream of asylum-
seekers entering the EU through the Bulgarian border with Turkey. By engaging with Bulgaria's 
response to refugee migration through this EU entry route, the paper was interested in the 
implications of the policies and practices towards asylum in the wider context of the EU asylum 
framework. The investigation was triggered by the visible misalignment between legal and 
political in the implementation of the EU asylum rules in the specific national context (and 
beyond). It traced the justification for a restrictive national implementation of an otherwise 
liberalizing legal framework in the narratives and practices of security and exclusion. The paper 
selected one element of the making and talking of security and community - borders and (re-) 
bordering - and traced its interpretation and application in the Bulgarian context.  
The analysis set out to demonstrate two things. In the first place, Bulgaria's re-bordering 
practices and narratives are deeply interconnected with EU level practices and narratives. By 
tracing the securitization and exclusion that they produce, the analysis reveals the precarious 
role human rights play on both levels. The study thus challenges the assessment of the EU 
asylum system in terms of failing Europeanization. It paves the way for a new perspective on 
the perceived discrepancies between liberalizing EU rules on asylum and restrictive national 
implementation as a particular vision of the Europeanization of asylum, rather than as a failure 
of it.  
At the same time, the analysis offered here set out to emphasize the negative consequences of 
such a vision of Europeanization of asylum for the provision of protection, for the 
harmonization of asylum, for the legitimacy of political communities within the EU, and for the 
legitimacy of the EU itself. Looking into specific aspects of the territorial, organizational and 
conceptual re-bordering of asylum-seekers in Bulgaria of the recent couple of years, the 
analysis highlighted how they undermine the provision of protection, how they weaken the 
supranational arrangement, and how they shape public perceptions of threat, both physical and 
ontological, towards Otherness and the foreign.  
The paper argued that the dynamics of (re-)bordering, identified empirically in the studied 
context, institutionalize the securitization and exclusion of asylum-seekers as a matter of 
national policy but is also linked to practices and narratives at the EU level and is reflected into 
EU-wide outcomes, as the paper suggests. These links and outcomes invite further investigation 
in different national contexts, and from various angles. In terms of the EU asylum framework, 
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however, they indicate that studying the CEAS as an inherently flawed regime is not necessarily 
reasonable. Rather, the Europeanization of asylum should be studied against the background of 
wider EU processes (securitization of migration, an exclusionary nationalistic vision of Europe, 
austerity and challenge to the welfare state, etc). In light of these processes, the restrictive 
national application of nominally liberalized EU asylum rules appears to be in line with 
Europeanization. Whether this is compatible with the promise of European integration, and 
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